aspect of the theory as its flight into statistics, ("die flucht in die Statistik") an evasion ("eine Ausflucht") that he saw as a dead end for physics ("eine Sackgasse") 2 . Einstein used the challenge posed by the interpretation of the state function to criticize the theory on these two grounds, and to call for something better. I argue that this fact about the critical and hortatory context of Einstein's interest in pursuing interpretive issues needs to be taken into account if we are to understand what his own interpretations might have
been, and what they were not.
In correspondence with Werner Heisenberg early in 1926 Einstein criticized the new Heisenberg-Born-Jordon matrix mechanics. In his response to the criticisms, Heisenberg remarked, "Then it seems most likely to me that quantum mechanics can never make direct statements about the individual process, rather it always gives only average values in the sense of Bohr-Kramers-Slater." (Letter to Einstein, February 18, 1926 ) It is well known that Einstein reached a similar conclusion in his own thinking about the quantum theory. He expressed it negatively in his frequent references to the theory as providing only an incomplete (or partial) description of individual systems. He put it positively when he characterized the theory as describing ensembles of systems.
Einstein's emphasis on ensembles and descriptive incompleteness occurred during the informal discussions at the 1927 Solvay conference, which were Einstein's earliest public remarks on the quantum theory. There he contrasts a "complete" with an "incomplete"
interpretation of the state function and argues that difficulties with treating the state function as providing a complete description require that we adopt the ensemble view and treat it, instead, as providing an incomplete one. Exactly this same format; that is, contrasting a complete with an incomplete interpretation of the state function, is a key feature in many of Einstein's later writings. In the Solvay conference of 1927 the difficulty for the complete interpretation centered on considerations of locality in connection with the reduction of the wave packet, and on the quantum approximation to the behavior of macroscopic objects. These remained Einstein's dominant concerns although after 1935, and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen ("EPR") paper [9] , he generally used coupled systems to get at the locality and reduction issues. what is happening to other systems from which it is spatially separated.
(D) Real states and observables. The quantum "observables", however,
are not suitable for specifying the "real states" of physical systems. One sign of that is the inherent limitation on the empirical determinability of these quantities marked by the uncertainty formulas, as in (A).
(E) The new physics: realist and determinist. To overcome the descriptive incompleteness in (B) one must look for new physical concepts, and build a new physical theory. As in (C), the concepts of the new physics will allow for the description of the "real states" of individual systems (hopefully in a space/time framework). The new theory will not involve probability fundamentally. Rather, probability will only come in With regard to clarity we must recognize that although Einstein frequently raised these topics, he seldom amplified his remarks, and never specifically enough to constitute any definite and detailed account. With regard to constancy, the situation is even more intriguing. If we attend to the interpretive opinions that Einstein expressed in a variety of different writings and contexts, we find that they do not all point in the same direction.
Indeed, the most obvious fact about "Einstein's interpretation of the quantum theory", is that he espouses not one interpretation, but three. I suppose this fact is so apparent to readers who have examined Einstein's works that, to my knowledge, no commentator on "Einstein's interpretation of the quantum theory" has felt the need to point it out.
Apparent or not, there are three recognizable interpretations to be found in Einstein's writings: an instrumental interpretation, a subjective interpretation, and a hidden variables interpretation. Of the three, the literature has only focused on the hidden variables interpretation. I begin, therefore, with the other two.
THE INSTRUMENTAL INTERPRETATION
In 1948 Wolfgang Pauli organized a special issue of Dialectica [3] Here then is a question of confounding the subjective with the objective world. The indeterminism which belongs to quantum physics is a subjective indeterminism. It must be related to something, else indeterminism has no meaning, and here it is related to our own inability to follow the course of individual atoms and forecast their activity. In the subjective version the ψ function represents our knowledge of some (but never all)
empirically determinable features of a system. The ψ function describes our state of knowledge of an ensemble of systems each of which is known to have a limited number of empirically determinable features in common. Just as the instrumentalist version amounts to a qualitative formulation of the interpretation generally associated with Born, this subjective version is a statistical interpretation of the sort often associated with E.C.
Kemble [15] . This is the closing paragraph of the EPR paper. The reference to the possibility of a complete theory has been seen as pointing to a hidden variables interpretation of the quantum theory. Although one might take that reference as pointing instead to the new physics envisioned by Einstein (recall (E) of Section 1), rather than to hidden variables, there are some reasons internal to the EPR paper for thinking that hidden variables are being suggested. The second part of the EPR paper argues that since we can directly measure either position or momentum on one system in a coupled pair and use that to infer the value of position (or momentum) in the distant and unmeasured system without disturbing it, the unmeasured system must already possess values of both variables. This argument makes use of the "criterion of reality" stated in the first part of the paper. ("If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity." [9], p.777) The (simultaneous)
THE HIDDEN VARIABLES INTERPRETATION
values of position and momentum for the unmeasured system go beyond what the quantum theory itself provides, and may thus be considered "hidden" from the point of view of the theory, and as giving a more "complete" description. More generally, one might suggest that the form of a hidden variables interpretation alluded to in the EPR paper is a theory in which each of the quantum observables possesses a definite value at all times.
While such a point of view may well be suggested by the argument of the EPR Einstein's thinking about ensembles, which it extends and embellishes, while ignoring others.
REFUTATIONS
Despite the difficulty in pinning Einstein down on hidden variables, the no- There is more than careless reading and scholarship involved in the project of using the no-hidden-variables results to discredit Einstein. That project derives from the early struggles over the proper understanding of the quantum theory and the desire on the part of the proponents of the theory to certify its viability in order to attract to it the best scientific minds. From its earliest moments, Einstein stood out in dissent from the whole quantum program, which he regarded as a blind alley for physics. In short order Einstein became the most forceful and influential critic of the program. Because a vigorous offense is often a good defense, it is not surprising, therefore, to see the growth of a tradition of finding fault with Einstein. Since the quantum program felt the need to show
Einstein wrong, it is also not surprising that the purported refutations were received without a great deal of scrutiny concerning the extent to which they accurately reflected Einstein's views. Anyway, physicists are not scholars and when one needs to shoot something down, it is not useful to discover that one's objective has rather the character of mist.
The tradition of targeting Einstein, fostered during the 1930s in defense of the quantum program, continues even today when the quantum theorists need not be so defensive. No doubt this is due in part to the fact that a research practice tends to legitimize itself, to build a community of investigators, and thus to prolong its lifespan.
In part the recurrent interest in refuting Einstein is also due to his extraordinary scientific fame, fame enough even today to make questioning of any aspect of Einstein's scientific work an immediate source of attention. 5 Thus, by recognizing the importance of Einstein as a critic of the quantum theory, we get some insight into the peculiar features of the refuting tradition. Focusing on Einstein's role as a critic can also help us understand the interpretive leeway that he reserved for himself with regard to the theory.
EINSTEIN AS CRITIC
Einstein used the incompleteness (as he saw it) of the quantum theory to call attention to the essential role of probability and statistics in the theory. He regarded this aspect of quantum mechanics as a major defect and he looked forward to a more deterministic physics, one where probability would not enter in a fundamental way. By setting that incompleteness in the context of instrumental and subjective interpretations, Einstein pointed to the way that the quantum theory either brackets the question of an objective description of real states (instrumentalism), or simply replaces it by a subjective representation. This was the "risky game ... with reality" that Einstein found so objectionable.(Letter to Schrödinger, December 22, 1950) Thus Einstein's instrumental and subjective interpretations of the quantum theory serve to highlight the two features of the theory that he found most difficult to accept, its indeterminism and its irrealism.
Einstein believed these to be linked defects. In his repeated contrasts between a complete and an incomplete interpretation, and his arguments against completeness, Einstein was trying to show that one can not treat quantum indeterminism as realism of a higher order.
To do so would be tantamount to treating the stochastic information contained in the quantum state function as a complete description of the individual system. He argued, however, that quantum indeterminism is simply not compatible with realism, since when one postulates real states of affairs the quantum theoretic description turns out to be incomplete.
To describe a thing as incomplete is to suggest the possibility of something more.
That is to say, the very language Einstein chose for his critical discussions of the quantum theory is one that inevitable points to the prospect of some better, more complete theory. As we have seen, the unsatisfactory features of the quantum theory brought out by Einstein's interpretations were precisely the defects that he hoped a new physics would overcome. He summarized just this line of thought in his "Replies" [19] as follows.
There exists, however, a simple psychological reason for the fact that this most nearly obvious interpretation [that the state function "refers to ensembles of systems and not to individual systems"] is being shunned.
For if the statistical quantum theory does not pretend to describe the individual system (and its development in time) completely, it appears unavoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual system; in doing so it would be clear from the very beginning that the elements of such a description are not contained within the conceptual scheme of the statistical quantum theory. ( [19] , p.672)
Thus when Einstein took up the interpretive challenge of the quantum theory it was not only as a critic and dissenter, he also wanted to point the research community in what he took to be a better direction for physics. In short, his interpretations were hortatory, as well as descriptive.
It is important to keep this hortatory aspect in mind when we try to understand
Einstein's vacillating engagement with hidden variables. In particular, one should note that the hortatory function would be jeopardized if we understood him to hold that what the quantum theory actually treats, albeit statistically, is a determinate domain whose individual features are entirely objective and knowable. Such an account interprets the quantum theory as a deterministic hidden variables theory. To accept it would lead one to look (as de Broglie and Bohm did) for a more satisfactory and detailed treatment of the underlying determinate and objective domain. It would encourage, that is, the active development of hidden variables physics. That path, however, was not the one that
Einstein followed in his own research, nor a path that he admired or encouraged in others.
Einstein believed that the task for physics was to search for the "real states" of physical systems, to find new concepts that will refer to them, and to develop a new conceptual framework for their treatment. This framework should provide the basis for a fundamental physical theory that will not involve probability in an irreducible way. Such a theory may involve principled limitations in measuring the non-elementary variables, since it will have to yield quantum mechanics, including the uncertainty formulas, as some sort of limiting case. (See [19] , pp.666-67.) According to this conception the complete description is something " after which one must search." (Letter to Pauli, May 2, 1948). For the concepts that go into this complete description, the ones that describe the real state of affairs, will have to be different from those of the quantum theory. As
Einstein put it to Pauli in this same letter, "Naturally this complete description would not come out of the fundamental concepts used in point-mechanics."
The idea that the theoretical description of real physical states is not to be given in In the last few years several attempts have been made to complete quantum theory as you have also attempted. But it seems to me that we are still quite remote from a satisfactory solution to the problem. I myself have tried to approach this by generalising the law of gravitation. But I must confess that I was not able to find a way to explain the atomistic character of nature. My opinion is that if an objective description through the field as an elementary concept is not possible, then one has to find a possibility to avoid the continuum (together with space and time) 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As Einstein saw it, the "flight into statistics" enabled the quantum theory to hang onto the classical dynamical concepts even though they were not capable of yielding an objective and empirically satisfactory description of physical reality. He wrote to
Schrödinger, "Your claim that the concepts p, q will have to be given up if they can only claim such "shaky" meaning seems to me fully justified." (Letter of May 31, 1928. See
[11] p.18ff.) Einstein used the idiom of "incomplete descriptions" to express these reservations. Alternatively, he would say that the state function refers to an ensemble and not to the individual system. The rhetoric here indicates at once the stance of a critic and also that of a guide, one whose criticism is in aid of helping physics to find a better way. I have argued that if we set Einstein's interpretive writings on the quantum theory in the context of these dual functions (critical and hortatory) we are free to notice that Einstein actually offers three "interpretations" of the quantum theory: an instrumental one, a subjective one, and something in the area of hidden variables. Each of them suits
Einstein's critical and hortatory purpose. Each points to the theory's indeterminism and irrealism, and each points beyond. Perhaps for this reason Einstein saw no need to pick and choose among them. At any rate he does not.
Of the three interpretations, the hidden variables one is the most problematic. See [16] and [17] .
5 E.g., note how Wills [20] advertises his discussion of the evidence for general relativity.
6 These inefficiencies make the prism models testable, at least in certain cases. See [12] and [14] 
